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MINERAL SERVITUDES

Louisiana does not recognize the concept of a mineral estate.1 The
closest concept that Louisiana has is the "mineral servitude," a type of
mineral right which is somewhat like a mineral estate, except that a
mineral servitude automatically terminates through "prescription of
nonuse" if the servitude is not used for any period of ten consecutive
years.2
A.

Interruption of Prescription of Nonuse by Unit Operations

In Petitjean II v. Samson Contour Energy E&P, LLC, servitude co
owners fought over the right to receive a portion of the proceeds from
a productive well that was drilled in 2006.3 The plaintiffs, along with
other individuals, previously had been co-owners of certain land in
indivision, including the land on which the productive well was drilled,
but they had partitioned the land in 1993.4 In the act of partition, the
co-owners reserved a single mineral servitude over the entire area,
with each of them being a co-owner of the servitude. They also
agreed in the partition that they would keep their mineral interests "in
undivided ownership ... for the maximum allowable period of time."5
The parties' dispute over the rights to proceeds from the productive
well turned on whether the servitude had terminated prior to 2006
based on prescription of nonuse for the area where the well was
drilled. Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, production or operations
that occur on the servitude tract generally will interrupt prescription
of nonuse as to the entire servitude.6 If a unit includes only a portion
of a servitude tract, unit production or operations outside the servi
tude will interrupt prescription, but only for the portion of the servi
tude tract within the unit.7 Nevertheless, Louisiana Mineral Code
article 75 allows parties to alter this default rule by agreeing "ex
pressly and in writing" that any unit operations will interrupt prescrip
tion as to the entire servitude.8
At the time the productive well was drilled in 2006, more than ten
years had passed without any mineral production or operations occur
ring on the servitude tract.9 Further, more than ten years had passed
1. See Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So. 2d 831, 836 (La. 1959); Long
Bell Petr�leum Co. v. Tritico, 43 So. 2d 782, 791 (La. 1949); Indigo Minerals, L.L.C. v.
Pardee Mmerals, L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 1122, 1127-28 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 46 So. 3d
1274 (La. 2010).
2. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:21-:23, :27 (2000).
3. See Petitjean v. Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC, 51 So. 3d 200, 201 (La.
Ct. App. 2010), writ denied, 57 So. 3d 339 (La. 2011).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See Lee v. Giauque, 97 So. 669, 670 (La. 1923).
See �A. REv. STA T. ANN. § 31:33 (2000).
See id. § 31:35.
Petitjean, 51 So. 3d at 201.
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without any unit production or operations for any unit that included
the area where the productive well was drilled. But there had been
unit operations during the prior ten years for units that included other
portions of the servitude tract.
Relying on the default rule that unit operations occurring outside
the servitude tract will interrupt prescription only for the portion of
the servitude within the unit, the defendants argued that servitude had
terminated by prescription of nonuse as to the portion of the servitude
tract where the productive well was now located. The plaintiffs, how
ever, argued that the parties to the partition had altered the default
rule by stating in the act of partition that they agreed to keep their
mineral interests "in undivided ownership . .. for the maximum allow
able period of time."10 The plaintiffs' reasoning was that altering the
default rule to interrupt prescription as to the entire servitude would
have the effect of keeping the parties' entire mineral interests in "un
divided" ownership because the servitude was co-owned, whereas al
lowing the servitude to terminate as to certain areas by prescription
would result in the mineral interests reverting to individual ownership
in those areas.
The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs' argument. The Louisi
ana Third Circuit stated that the parties to an act creating a mineral
servitude need not expressly refer to Mineral Code article 75 in order
to overrule the default rule regarding the interruption of prescription
by unit operations, but they "must leave no question" that they in
tended to agree that unit operations occurring outside the servitude
tract would interrupt prescription as to the entire servitude if the unit
overlapped the servitude.11 Although an interruption of prescription
as to the entire servitude would have the effect of keeping the entirety
of the mineral interests "in undivided ownership" for the maximum
time, the language of the act creating the servitude did not clearly
demonstrate an intent to alter the default rule regarding interruption
of prescription by unit operations.12
B.

Creation of Servitudes-One or Several?

The parties disputed ownership of the royalty proceeds from a cer
tain well, with the ownership question turning on whether prior trans
actions had created a single servitude or multiple servitudes.13 The
competing claimants were the landowner and the Mikell Group,
which consisted of several persons who claimed to be owners of a sin
gle mineral servitude. The Mikell Group claimed that a single servi
tude had been created over several contiguous tracts by an act of
10. Id. at 203.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Neumin Prod. Co. v. Tiger Bend, Ltd., 58 So. 3d 1088, 1090 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 63 So. 3d 984 (La. 2011).
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partition and exchange in 1983. Further, they claimed that the servi
tude had been kept alive by mineral activity on one of the tracts cov
ered by the alleged single servitude, though the activity was not on the
tract that now had a productive well.

The landowner sought summary judgment, arguing multiple servi
tudes had been created and that the particular servitude that included
the well's location had been extinguished by ten years prescription of
nonuse.14 The trial court granted the landowner's motion for sum
mary judgment. The appellate court affirmed. The appellate court
noted that the 1983 transaction had involved several tracts of land
owned by different individuals. The court concluded that the individ
uals had made mineral reservations prior to combining the land for
partition, and therefore they must have intended that each of them
would reserve the minerals he owned prior to the partition.15 Thus,

they had created multiple servitudes. The court concluded that the
servitude for the area that now contained a productive well had termi
nated based on prescription of nonuse.

II.

LEASE INTERPRETATION DISPUTES
A.

Most-Favored-Nations Clause

Hoover Tree granted a mineral lease to Goodrich covering 317
acres in Caddo Parish. The lease specified a $1,000 per acre bonus, a

25% royalty, and that Goodrich would be bound by a most-favored
nations clause ("MFN").16 The MFN provided that if Goodrich or its
"successors and assigns" paid a higher bonus or royalty to any other
lessor within a specified area during the primary term of Hoover

Tree's lease, Hoover Tree would be paid the difference.

Goodrich subsequently transferred a one-half interest in the lease
to Chesapeake as to depths below the Cotton Valley Formatio n.17
Goodrich did not retain an overriding royalty on the transferred inter

est. Hoover Tree learned that Chesapeake had paid bonuses as high
as $25,000 per acre and royalties as high as 30% within the specified

area during the primary term of the Hoover Tree lease.18 Relying on
the MFN clause and an argument that Chesapeake was Goodrich's
"assign," Hoover Tree filed suit against Goodrich, Chesapeake, and
others, seeking a higher royalty and higher bonus.
The district court granted judgment for Hoover Tree, increasing its

royalty to 30% and awarding it more than $7.6 million, the difference
between a bonus of $1000 per acre and a bonus of $25,000 per acre for
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1093.
16. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., 63 So. 3d 159, 161-62
.
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 69 So. 3d 1161 (La. 2011).
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 162.
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The defendants appealed, arguing that the transfer to
317 acres.19
Chesapeake was a sublease, not an assignment. and therefore that
Chesapeake was neither a "successor" nor an "assign." The appellate
court rejected the defendants' arguments and affirmed, holding that
Goodrich's transfer of an undivided interest in the deep formations.
without reservation of an overriding royalty, constituted an assign
ment. Therefore, the MFN applied.20 The appellate court held that
both Chesapeake and Goodrich were liable for the higher royalty and
bonus because the Louisiana Mineral Code makes an assignee directly
liable for lease obligations.21
B.

Continuous Drilling Operations

H & K Limited's predecessor-in-interest granted a mineral lease to
Martin Producing, which later assigned the lease to Chesapeake.22
The lease provided that it would remain in effect for a primary term of
three years and as long thereafter as minerals were produced in pay
ing quantities. The lease also had a continuous drilling operations
clause which provided that if there was not production at the end of
the primary term, but the lessee was conducting drilling operations,
the lease would continue in effect so long as the lessee continued drill
ing operations or produced minerals in paying quantities without a
break of more than ninety consecutive days. At the end of the pri
mary term, Chesapeake was not producing minerals from the leased
premises, but it had begun drilling operations. Chesapeake continued
such operations without any cessation exceeding ninety days and put
the well into production. H & K brought suit for a judgment that the
lease had terminated, but the district court granted summary judg
ment in favor of Martin and Chesapeake, holding that plain language
of the continuous drilling operations clause meant that the lease had
been maintained.23 The appellate court affirmed.
C.

Granting Clause in Louisiana Bath Form Lease

In Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., the
parties disputed the meaning of a clause in a standard form lease-a
Louisiana Bath form 14-BRI-24-that granted rights "exclusively
unto lessee for the purpose of ...exploring ... and producing oil, gas,
and all other minerals" from the leased premises.24 The lessor sought
a declaratory judgment that the lease did not apply to the Haynesville
19. Id. at 160.
20. Id. at 180-81.
21. Id.
22. H & K Ltd. of La. v. Martin Producing, L.L.C., 70 So. 3d 847, 847-48 (La. Ct.
App. 2011).
23. Id. at 850-51.
24. Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d 640,
641-42 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 438 F. App'x 340 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Shale , which is found at a depth of about 10,400 feet. The plaintiffs
assert ed that no wells in the area had ever been drilled to a depth
greater than 7,500 feet at the time the lea�e was granted in 1950, and
.
that the parties had not contemplated dn lmg to depths as grea� as

�

10 400 feet at the time when the lease was signed. The defendant filed
a
otion to dismiss. The court initially denied the motion to dismiss,
but on reconsideration, the court granted the motion to dismiss, hold
ing that the lease unambiguously granted to the lessee the right to
explore and drill to all depths.25

�

D.

"Calculate and Pay" Clause

The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act ("DWRRA") provides incen
tives for deepwater drilling on federal lease tracts sold in certain areas
of the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2000.26 For example, section
304 provides that lessees will not owe royalties on the first 87.5 million
barrels of oil equivalent ("BOE") produced from water depths greater
than 800 meters. Lesser amounts of royalty relief are granted for
wells located at depths greater than 200 meters, but less than 800
meters.
In 1999, a lessee granted overriding royalty interests to several indi
viduals for a well that qualified for 87.5 million BOE of royalty relief
under section 304.27 The agreements granting the overrides stated
that the overrides would be "payable out of all oil, gas, casinghead gas
and associated substances produced," but also provided that "[t]he
overriding royalty interest assigned . . shall be calculated and paid in
.

the same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions as the
landowner's royalty under the Lease. "28 The latter provision is a "Cal
culate and Pay" clause.
Statoil and Total owned fractional working interests in the lease.
They filed motions for a summary judgment that they did not have to
pay overriding royalties until the well produced 87.5 BOE because
that is how the lessor's royalty would be "calculated and paid."29 One
of the override owners opposed the motions, arguing that the override
royalties were owed on all production, and that the lessees' override
obligations were not affected by DWRRA.30 The court granted the
motion for summary judgment, holding that the obligation to pay
overriding royalties did not begin until there was an obligation to pay
royalties to the lessor.
25. Id. at 646-47.
26. See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 10458, § 304, 109 Stat. 563. 565-66 (1995) (not codified but contained in a note to 43

u.s.c. §

1337 (2006)).
27. Total E & P USA, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil
0106, 2010 WL 5207591, *1-2 (E.D. La. 2010).
28. Id. at *2 (emphasis added ).
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id. at *4.

&

Gas Corp., Nos. 09-6644, 10-
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OTHER LEASE DISPUTES

Error as a Basis to Vitiate Consent

In Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, the plaintiffs were individuals
who had granted a mineral lease covering seventy-six acres in Bossier
Parish in April 2008.31 Six months after granting the lease, the pla n
tiffs filed suit seeking to rescind the lease based on error. The plam
tiffs alleged that the Haynesville Shale extended beneath the leased

�

premises, and that they had not known this when they signed the
lease, but that the lessee had known. The plaintiffs argued that these
facts were a sufficient basis to rescind the lease based on error. The
district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the de
fendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. 32
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal noted that mineral
leases are governed by the Louisiana Mineral Code,33 as well as the
general principles of contract law provided by the Louisiana Civil
Code.34 The Civil Code provides that contracts require the consent of
the parties,35 and that "consent may be vitiated by error,"36 but error
vitiates consent only if: (1) the error concerns a reason without which
the party would not have entered the contrac t, and the reason was
known to the other party;37 or (2) the error concerned the nature of
the contract, the thing that is the object of the contract, or a substan
tial quality of the thing.38
The plaintiffs argued that the object of the contract was the land
and its mineral formations, and their lack of know ledge about an ex
ceptional quality of the land-the presence of the Haynesville Shale
was an error that vitiated consent. But the Second Circuit rejected
that argument, stating that mineral exploration is inherently s pecula
tive.39 Accordingly, "[t]he inherent nature and character of the right
to extract oil and gas from the soil is such as not to be susceptible of
having an intrinsic, determinable, and fixable value. "40 Given the
speculative nature of mineral exploration, and that "both the plaintiffs
and the defendants could speculate as to the existence and value of
minerals" beneath the leased premises, the plaintiffs' alleged "error"
was not the sort that would vitiate consent.41
v. Twin Cities Dev., 48 So. 3d 341, 342 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
Id.
Id.; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 (2000).
Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 342-43.
Id. at 343 (citing LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1927 (2008)).
Id. (citing LA. Crv. CoDE ANN. art. 1948 (2008)).
Id. (citing LA. Crv. CooE ANN. art. 1949 (2008)).
Id. (citing LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 1950 (2008)).
Id. at 344.
Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 ' 609 (La. 1924)) .
Id.

31. Cascio
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

[Vol. 18
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B.

The Suspension Doctrine

The Ferraras granted a mineral lease covering a forty-eight-acre
tract in DeSoto Parish in 1988.42 The lessee drilled two wells on lands
unitized with the leased premises-one in 1988 and another in 1989.
Both wells were productive and still were producing at the time of
trial. The lessee also drilled a dry hole on the leased premises in 1990.
Questar, which had been assigned the lessee's rights, drilled a well on
land unitized with the leased land in 2000. The well was productive
and remained in production at the time of trial. But the lessors sued
for lease cancellation, asserting that the lessee had not adequately de
veloped deeper formations, such as the Haynesville Shale. The plain
tiffs filed their suit about five months after Chesapeake made an
announcement about the Haynesville Shale's potential and one week
Conservation had made an
after the Louisiana Office of
announcement.
After a bench trial, the district court granted cancellation of the
lease as to all depths deeper than the Hosston formation.43 On ap
peal, Questar argued that the district court had erred by allowing the
Ferraras to introduce evidence of Questar's and other companies'
drilling of Haynesville Shale wells on other properties subsequent to
the Ferraras filing suit. Questar argued that such evidence was not
relevant because both an express clause in the lease and the jurispru
dential "suspension doctrine" provided that a lessee's duties to ex
plore and develop are suspended during litigation in which a lessor
challenges the validity of a lease.
But a three-judge panel of the Louisiana Second Circuit disagreed,
concluding that the jurisprudential suspension doctrine applies to ser
vitudes, not leases.44 The panel concluded that the express lease
clause did not apply because the lessors did not challenge the validity
of the lease. Rather, they recognized the lease as valid and simply
sued for lease cancellation. The court agreed with Questar that post
lawsuit conduct could not prove whether someone breached a duty to
explore prior to suit being filed, but held that the trial court did not
err in considering post-lawsuit conduct as circumstantial evidence of
Questar's intent prior to suit being filed.
Nevertheless, the three-judge panel reversed. They stated that lease
cancellation is a harsh remedy, and that the Ferraras had not
presented any expert testimony that a reasonably prudent operator
�ould have drilled a well to the Haynesville formation prior to the
time the Ferraras made demand or filed suit.45 In the absence of such
testimony, the mere fact that Questar had not drilled a Haynesville
42. Ferrara

2011).

v.

Questar Exploration & Prod. Co. , 70 So. 3d 974 977

43. Id. at 979.
44. Id. at 981.
45. Id. at 983-84.

'

(La.

Ct. App.
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Shale well on the leased premises within five months of Chesapeake's
announcement and one week of the Commissioner's announcement
was not sufficient to support a finding that Questar had breached its
duty of further exploration.
A five-judge Second Circuit panel that included Judge Caraway
considered a request for rehearing, and denied rehearing.46 Judge

Caraway, who was not on the three-judge panel, wrote an opinion
concurring in the denial of rehearing and declaring that he agreed
with the result below, but he disagreed with the original panel's state
ment that the "suspension doctrine" does not apply to leases. Judge
Caraway wrote that the original panel's statement is inconsistent with
Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence.47 Judge Caraway stated that
a lessor's erroneous suit for lease cancellation breaches the warranty
of peaceful possession and justifies a suspension of the duty to de
velop.

Two

other

judges

joined

Judge

Caraway's

concurring

opinion.48
C.

Pre-suit Notice of Royalty Claims in Putative Class Action

Mineral Code article 137 requires a lessor to give written notice to a
lessee thirty days prior to filing claims based on the nonpayment, un
derpayment, or untimely payment of royalties.49 In Williams v. Chesa
peake Louisiana, Inc., a plaintiff brought a putative class action for
allegedly unpaid royalties.50 The district court adhered to existing
United States Fifth Circuit jurisprudence by holding that the required
notice cannot be given by one person on behalf of a putative class.51
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the notice requirement
does not apply if a plaintiff seeks unpaid royalties, but not "damages."
D.

Judicial Control Doctrine

Several members of the Walker family granted mineral leases to
Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P. for land in Caddo Parish.52 The Walkers
brought suit the following year, alleging that Chesapeake had
breached three provisions in the leases. The sole relief sought by the
Walkers was lease cancellation.53
One of the three lease clauses allegedly breached by Chesapeake
prohibited the company from using the surface of the leased premises
46. Id. at 985.
47. Id. at 987.
48. Id.
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2000).
50. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *l (W.D.
La. May 13, 2011 ).
51. Id. at *3 (following Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d
459 , 461 (5th Cir. 2004)).
52. Walker v. Chesapeake La., Ltd. P'ship, 44 0 Fed. App'x 254, 255 (5th Cir.
2011).
53. Id.
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without the Walkers' consent. The Walkers alleged that Chesapeake
violated the clause by crossing the leased premises in all terrain vehi
cles without permission and by staking the location of a future well
site on the leased premises without permission. It was undisputed that
these alleged actions did not cause any physical damages.
A second clause allegedly breached by Chesapeake required the
company to share certain well data with the Walkers, pursuant to a
"data license agreement" to which the parties would mutually agree.54
The undisputed facts showed that the parties had never agreed to a
data license agreement, and that Chesapeake had not shared the re
quired well data with the Walkers, but that Chesapeake had contacted
the Walkers in an attempt to negotiate a data license agreement the
day after the Walkers notified Chesapeake of its alleged breach of the
duty to share well data.
The third clause allegedly breached by Chesapeake states that if
"Lessee acquires seismic permits on lands within one mile of the
Leased Premises, Lessee agrees to negotiate in good faith to include
both the Leased Premises and surrounding acreage so as to ade
quately provide fully imaged 3-D seismic coverage of the Leased
Premises."55 The parties disputed whether Chesapeake's duty under
this clause was triggered by Chesapeake merely acquiring seismic per
mits, as the Walkers contended, or whether the duty arose only if
Chesapeake actually conducted seismic testing within one mile.
In support of their request for lease cancellation, the Walkers relied
on Louisiana Civil Code article 2013, which states: "When the obliger
fails to perform, the lessee has a right to the judicial cancellation of
the contract ...."56 The Walkers argued that article 2013 provided
them an unconditional right to lease cancellation if they proved a
breach by Chesapeake. Chesapeake argued otherwise, contending
that the doctrine of "judicial control" gives courts the discretion to
decide whether to terminate a contract or award a lesser remedy in
the event of a breach.
Chesapeake sought summary judgment on two grounds: (1) it had
substantially performed; and (2) under the doctrine of "judicial con
trol," the district court need not terminate the leases, even if Chesa
peake had breached the leases, and under the facts of this case the
court should not terminate the leases.57 The district court concluded
that an issue of fact precluded a summary judgment based on Chesa
peake's contention that it had substantially performed its obligations.
But the court granted summary judgment on the basis of judicial con
trol, and dismissed the Walkers' claims.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

257-58.
258.
256.
255.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Walkers' argument that article 2013 requires lease termi
nation in the event of a breach. The court noted that Louisiana courts
have sometimes declined to award lease cancellation, and that article
2013 should be interpreted as giving a party a right to seek judicial
dissolution of a contract, while leaving the court with discretion
whether to grant that remedy.
Turning to the standard for contract dissolution, the Fifth Circuit
noted that Louisiana jurisprudence does not favor lease cancellation.
The court determined that a "dereliction of duty must be of a substan
tial nature and cause injury to the lessor" in order for lease dissolution
to be warranted.58 The Fifth Circuit stated that the decision whether
to exercise "judicial control" to avoid lease termination is a decision
for the judge, not a jury, that appellate review of a decision to exercise
judicial control is based on an abuse of discretion standard, and that
summary judgment is appropriate if the judge determines that judicial
control should be exercised even under the version of "the facts most
favorable to the non-moving party that could be found by a jury. "59
Applying these standards, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment, holding that the court had not abused its
discretion by declining to terminate the leases.
IV.

RECORDATION ISSUES

A.

Notices of Lease

Effective January 1, 2011, Louisiana Revised Statute 44:104 was
moved to Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 9, known as the Civil Code
ancillaries, and was redesignated as 9:2742.60 Among other things, the
statute specifies that recordation of a notice of lease will be given the
same effect as recordation of the lease itself.

B.

Unrecorded Exercise of Option to Extend Lease

Claude and Linda Sparks purchased several acres in Caddo Par
ish.61 The parties to the sale had agreed that the sellers would reserve
25% of the minerals, but the parties signed an act of sale that errone
ously stated that the sellers reserved 75%. Some time later, XTO of
fered to lease a 75% mineral interest from the Sparks for $20,000 per
acre, but XTO withdrew the offer after discovering that the Sparks
seemed to own only 25% of the minerals. An act of correction was
recorded to reflect that the sellers had reserved only 25% of the minSS.
S9.
60.
61.

Id. at 256.
Id.
H.B. 857, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 La. Acts 284.
Stt Sparks v. United Title & Abstract, L.L.C., 56 So. 3d 302, 303 (La. Ct. App.
2010), writ dtnkd, 57 So. 3d 337 (La. 2011).
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erals, but, by that time, XTO was no longer interested in leasing the
property.
The Sparks brought suit against their title insurance company,
which had prepared the erroneous act of sale. The company moved
for summary judgment, noting that the Sparks' land was subject to a
previously recorded lease to St. Mary Land & Exploration. That
lease's three-year primary term had expired (and apparently the lease
had not been maintained by production), but the lease contained an
option for a two-year extension, which St. Mary had exercised. The
title insurance company argued that the Sparks were not damaged by
XTO's withdrawal of its lease offer because the pre-existing lease to
St. Mary precluded the Sparks from granting a valid lease to XTO.
The Sparks argued that they were not bound by St. Mary's unre
corded exercise of its option to renew.62 The trial court disagreed,
holding that, under the Louisiana public records doctrine, a third
party is bound by an unrecorded exercise of an option to renew a
lease if the lease containing the option is recorded. The Louisiana
Second Circuit affirmed.
C.

New Record Leaseholder Was Necessary Party in
Action to Rescind Trans/er

Morgan held the rights of lessee under several mineral leases, but
he assigned those rights to Winbeau Oil & Gas.63 Morgan later
brought suit to rescind the assignment, alleging that he had assigned
his rights based on false representations by an agent of Winbeau. In
the meantime, however, Winbeau had reassigned the leases to Pe
trohawk. The trial court rendered a judgment rescinding the assign
ment, but the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that
Petrohawk, the record leaseholder, was a necessary party under Loui
siana Code of Civil Procedure article 641.
V.
A.

LIENS

Validity of Lien Under Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act

Cutting Underwater Technologies USA, Inc. v. Con-Dive, LLC
concerned a dispute that arose after Hurricane Rita toppled a plat
form associated with a lessee's inactive well on the outer continental
shelf.64 The lessee hired a contractor that removed the platform, but
failed to pay its subcontractors.

The subcontractors responded by

placing liens on the lessee's property, pursuant to the Louisiana Oil
62. Id. at 304.
63. See Morgan v. Winbeau Oil & Gas Co., 57 So. 3d 1202, 1203-04 ( La. Ct. App.
2011) .
64. Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. Con-Dive, LLC, No. 09-387, 2011 WL
1103679, at *1 ( E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2011 ) .
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Well Lien Act65 ("LOWLA"), which applied as surrogate federal law
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act66 ("OCSLA").67
LOWLA protects those who provide work for "operations" per
formed at the "well site" of an oil or gas well.68 "Operations" include
"drilling, completing, testing, producing, reworking, or abandoning a
well." The lessee challenged the validity of the liens on two bases.
First, the lessee argued that removal of the platform was not part of
"abandoning a well. "69 The lessee had plugged the well and cut its
casing prior to Hurricane Rita. The lessee argued that those prior
steps had completed the abandonment. The court disagreed, conclud
ing that the subcontractors' work should be considered part of "aban
donment" because federal regulations require the removal of a
platform after well depletion. The lessee also argued that a subcon
tractor that performed sonic surveys of the site had not performed
work "at the well site." The court disagreed, stating that LOWLA
does not restrict "at the well site" to the immediate vicinity of the
well.
B.

Uniform Cancellation Affidavit

Act 124 of the Louisiana legislature's 2011 Regular Session enacted
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5166, which establishes the form for a
uniform cancellation affidavit that may be used for the cancellation of
mortgages and vendor's lien inscriptions, except for judicial and legal
mortgages.70 Act 124 does not prohibit the use of any other method
or form of cancellation otherwise authorized by law.
VI.

CONTAMINATION CLAIMS

The Marins and the Breauxs brought tort and contract claims
against the defendants, alleging that the defendants' oilfield activities
had contaminated the plaintiffs' land.71 The trial court awarded ap
proximately $21 million in compensatory damages, and an equal
amount of punitive damages under former Civil Code article 2315.3.72
The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Louisiana Su
preme Court granted writs. One of the major issues in the case was
whether the plaintiffs had asserted their claims timely.
Under Louisiana law, claims are subject to liberative prescription,
which is defined as "a mode of barring of actions as a result of inac65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861-4873 (2007).
66. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006).
67. Cutting, 2011 WL 1103679 at *l.
68. §§ 9:4861-4873.
69. Cutting, 2011 WL 1103679 at *2.
70. S.B. 24, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 La. Acts 124.
71. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 241 (La. 2010).
7�. Id. at 243. Former article 2315.3 allowed for the award of punitive damages in

certain circumstances for activities involving hazardous substan ces.
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Although the Civil Code states that

"[p]rescription runs against all person unless exception is established
by legislation,"74 Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that the running
of prescription may be suspended by the doctrine of contra non

valentem.75 Under this doctrine, the running of prescription is sus
pended in certain circumstances, including if plaintiffs neirher knew
nor reasonably should have known of their claim.76 In Marin, the
lower courts concluded that the running of prescription had been sus
pended by this "discovery rule" portion of the contra non valentem
doctrine, and therefore, the plaintiffs' claims had not prescribed.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the lower courts had erred
in concluding that contra non valentem had interrupted the running of
liberative prescription. For several years before filing suit, the plain
tiffs had known that sugar cane would not grow near pits operated by
the defendants. Further the plaintiffs had complained about contami
nation for several years. This demonstrated sufficient knowledge to
start the running of prescription. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argu
ment that prescription did not start running until an environmental
consultant informed them about the extent of contamination. Fur
ther, although a defendant allegedly misled the plaintiffs about certain
test results, the plaintiffs knew there was a problem and they could
have investigated further.
Next, the Court held that the evidence did not demonstrate a con
tinuing tort. It had been several years since the defendants had depos
ited wastes in the pits, and there was "scant" evidence that the pits
were still leaking. And even if a plume of contaminants that already
had leaked were still migrating beneath plaintiffs' property, the migra
tion did not constitute a continuing tort. Therefore, the plaintiffs' tort
claims were prescribed.77 This required reversal of the punitive dam
ages award because article 2315.3 punitive damages are a tort
remedy.78
Turning to the contract claims, the Court noted that the Breauxs
were successors to a mineral lease that expired more than ten years
before suit was filed. Therefore, their contract claims were pre
scribed.79 The Marins, on the other hand, still had a valid lease. The
defendants argued that their contractual liability to clean up the
Marins' property would not arise until after the lease expired, and that
7�. See LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007) (periods of liberative prescription
are similar to statutes of limitations).
74. See id. art. 3467.
75. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245.
76. Id.
. 77 . . See LA. �Iv: CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2008) (tort claims are subject to a one-year
hberat1ve prescnpt1ve).
78. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 256.
79. Id. (contract claims are subject to a ten-year liberative prescription); see LA.
C1v1L CoDE ANN. art. 3499 (2011).
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the Marins' contract claims therefore were premature. The court dis
agreed. Although a lessee's Civil Code article 2683 duty to return the
leased thing to the lessor in the original condition, but for "normal
wear and tear," does not arise until the end of the lease., other Civil
Code and Mineral Code articles impose duties not to damage the
leased premises, and claims based on those duties were not prema
ture. Accordingly, the court upheld the Marins' compensatory dam
ages award.
Ironically, the court's dismissal of all the Breauxs' claims based on
prescription meant that the court never reached one of the questions
that had prompted it to grant writs-namely, whether purchasers of
property have a right to sue for contamination that existed prior to
their purchase.80 This question arose because the contamination of
the Breauxs' land occurred prior to their purchase of it..
VII.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF FRACTURING
WATER COMPOSITION

The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR " ) pro
posed a new regulation that would require operators to disclose infor
mation about the water used in hydraulic fracturing.81 Specifically,
the regulation would require operators to disclose:
•
•

•
•

the volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid used
the types of additives used (for example, biocides, corrosion in
hibitors, friction reducers, etc.), as well as the volume of each type
the trade name and supplier of each additive, and
a list of the chemical compounds classified as hazaradous by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration that are con
tained in the additives, along with the maximum concentration of
each compound.82

If the identity of the chemical compound is a trade secret, the opera
tor would be excused from identifying the compound, but would be
required to identify the chemical family to which the compound
belongs.83
DNR collected public comments via e-mail and regular mail, and
held a public meeting on the proposed regulation on August 30,

80. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 256.
81. Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation Operations Hearing, DEP'T OF NATURAL REs.,
STATE OF LA., ( Aug. 30, 2011) , http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=calendar&
tmp=detail&eid=110&nid=249&pnid=231.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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2011. 84 As of that time, the regulation appeared to be on track to
become effective in late October 2011. 85
84. Keith B. Hall, Louisiana's Proposed Regulation for Disclosure of Fracking
Water Composition Appears on Track for Enactment, OIL & GAs L. BRIEF (Sept. 4,
2011), http://www.oilgaslawbrief.com/hydraulic-fracturing/louisianas-proposed-regula
tion-for-disclosure-of-fracking-water-composition-appears-on-track-for-ena/.
85. Id.

